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4Abstract
This study explores the extremely biased division of labor within 
Egyptian households. The effects of marriage on women’s market and 
domestic labor supplies are important aspects of this study. New expla-
nations for married women’s low participation rates are proposed. A 
matching model is estimated to determine how selection into marriage 
alters the time allocation of women. The empirical results show that 
marriage significantly affects both types of work. Married women spend 
weekly about eight hours less on market work relative to their single 
counterparts. Interestingly, marriage as a treatment increases domestic 
labor supply by thirty hours weekly. 
JEL classification: D13, J16, J22.
Keywords: Time Allocation, Marriage, Matching, Egypt.
1. Introduction
The classical dichotomy of “work in the market’’ versus “leisure’’ may 
serve as a good approximation of the role played by men in the productive 
activity of the household but does gross injustice to women, since it 
overlooks the whole time she spends outside the market on domestic 
activities. For this reason, studying females’ invisible unpaid work is 
crucial.
The need to adopt the household as a unit of analysis is particulary 
significant if the focus of attention is women’s economic behavior, as 
women tend to invest more time in activities that remain outside the 
cash economy. Economists have made a great effort to explain the market 
behavior of married women (i.e., patterns of participation, number of 
working hours, and determinants of wives earnings etc..), although very 
little has been done, in developing countries, to analyze the allocation of 
time within the home sector.
Let us start by defining “domestic production.’’ It represents all the 
unpaid work done to maintain family members and/or a home. This topic 
has been widely recognized in developed countries as an important area of 
research study since the 1990’s. Over the last decade, increasing attention 
5has been paid to the analysis of the labor division between members of the 
same household. 
As Becker (1964) and Gronau (1976) argued, calling the whole time 
spent by women outside the market sector “leisure’’ is to underestimate 
her contribution to the economy and to overlook the production activities 
she engages in through work at home. These activities are better termed 
“domestic production.’’
According to the UN convention “all persons of either sex who furnish the 
supply of labor for the production of economic goods and services’’ should have 
been included in labor force statistics during the last two decades (ILO, 
1976), quoted in Beneria (1981). In addition to this, economic activities, 
theoretically, should satisfy human needs through the production of goods 
and services, regardless of whether they are channeled through the cash 
market or other forms of exchange. There is no good reason why cooking 
and food processing should be considered less productive than growing 
food, especially that cooking for one’s employer is an economic activity 
but cooking for one’s own household is not (Waring, 1988). Adoption of 
such a definition would give visibility to women and children in national 
figures, since they make important economic contributions to both the 
domestic unit and to the national economy through these activities. 
Moreover, correct information on women’s work is “crucial for diagnosing 
the causes of poverty and inequality and for guiding policymakers in their 
attempts to improve living standards’’ (Schaffner, 2000a).
Neoclassical theory (Becker, 1965) has convincingly argued that the 
division between women’s participation in non-market activities and 
males’ participation in market activities is based on efficiency and the 
maximization of utility. However, the latter point does not seem to be 
justified, since females’ contribution to their household often exceeds that 
of males and their share of benefits is less (Folbre, 1984). Moreover, while 
many women contribute more hours of work to support their households 
than their spouses do, they often declare “I do not work’’ or “I am only a 
housewife,’’ because their labor is not remunerated. This has significant 
implications on their status and their position not only in their own 
households, but also in the society (Hoodfar, 1997).
As Gronau (1976) mentioned, the wife’s time is an iceberg since we have 
plenty of information about the visible tip, the time spent in the market, 
but almost none about the submerged part spent at home. In other words, 
“the problem of females’ activities is that they are often not ‘counted’ in statistics, 
not ‘accounted for’ in representations of the economy and not ‘taken into account’ 
when policies are created” (Elson, 2000). Suitable statistical means are 
6greatly needed to recognize and make visible the full extent of women’s 
work and all their contributions to the national economy, including their 
contribution to unremunerated sectors (United Nations, Fourth World 
Conference on Women, 1995-68.b).
An extensive literature exists on the “dilemmas’’ of modern family life 
(Gerson, 1985; Frinking and Willemsem, 1997). It has to be recognized that 
the division of paid and unpaid work concerns the family unit as well as 
the whole society since it has many socioeconomic implications.
Yet, time allocation in Egypt and in the Arab world has not been 
empirically studied. The present work aims at studying the allocation of 
time between market and domestic work to allow for better measurement 
and consideration of women’s work. Unfortunately, data on domestic 
production are only available for women. Nevertheless, assuming that 
men do not participate in non market work does not seem to be a strong 
assumption in the Egyptian and Arab contexts.
As in most developing economies, female labor force participation rates 
in Egypt remain relatively low. At different points of time- 1988, 1998 and 
2006- over 65 percent of ever married women were not actively engaged 
in market production and not more than 30 percent participated in the 
labor market (Assaad, 2007; Assaad and El-Hamidi, 2009). In other words, 
the women’s main occupation in Egypt remains housewives. The present 
research gives new evidence on the perfectly biased intrahousehold 
allocation of time that represents a considerable constraint for married 
females to reconciliate between family and professional lives. Hence, the 
implementation of more serious family-friendly policies calling for a more 
equitable division of labor within the family are strongly needed. For 
instance, increasing part-time jobs that take into full consideration the 
burden of women’s household responsibilities are also crucial to enable 
women to continue working after marriage.
Bearing in mind these facts, several questions arise: how has domestic 
production changed over time especially with the decrease in fertility and 
increase in time-saving devices. And, how does marriage affect the time-
use of Egyptian women. The present study provides a deep descriptive 
analysis that aims at having a glance at how Egyptian women use their time, 
the evolution of women’s time allocation over time and, the difference 
between single and married women’s time allocation. 
Time-use profiles are constructed using the Egyptian Labor Market 
Panel Surveys (ELMPS) of 1998 and 2006. Unfortunately, the time-
use questionnaire is available only for women and children. As the data 
collectors argued, men refused to answer the questions on domestic 
7activities because they think it is humiliating. For this reason, comparisons 
between time allocation of men and women cannot be made in this study.
In the analysis, we distinguish between single and married women. Note 
that, as defined in the present study, single women are those who have 
never been married, and married ones are those currently married and 
living with their spouse in the same household. All divorced and widowed 
women are excluded from the analysis.
This paper first provides a cross-sectional analysis that aims at 
exploring Egyptian women’s time-use among different work categories in 
2006. Then, using both surveys from 1998 and 2006, I make use of the 
panel aspect of the data in order to observe differences in women’s time-
use that result from changes in their marital status. Finally, a matching 
model is estimated to identify how selection into marriage alters the time 
allocation of women. 
In the analysis, I distinguish between three main work categories. (1) 
‘market work’ encompasses all activities that produce goods and services 
that contribute to national wealth and economic growth (Donahoe, 1999). 
The latter includes all market and subsistence activities whether paid 
monetarily, in kind, or unpaid work for family. This type of work is common 
in most developing countries. (2) ‘domestic work’ involves all unpaid work 
done to maintain family members and/or a home. It includes housework 
and child care activities (see Appendix A for more details). Finally, (3) 
‘total work’ regroups these two working activities to account for the total 
time spent per week in all types of work. Typically, subtracting the latter 
from the total weekly time available for individuals (24 hours multiplied 
by seven days, or 168 hours per week) would allow the calculation of the 
amount of hours per week available for leisure activities.
The paper is organized as follows: section 2 is devoted to the 
presentation of the data. Section 3 displays the descriptive analysis using a 
cross sectional as well as a panel approach. Section 4 presents the matching 
model specifications. Section 5 shows the empirical results and, section 6 
concludes.
2. Data
Data used in this study are obtained from the nationally-representative 
Egyptian Labor Market Panel Surveys (ELMPS) of 1998 and 2006. Of 
the 8,371 households interviewed in 2006, 3,701 were households that 
were interviewed in ELMS 1998, 2,167 were splits from the original 
8households, and 2,498 were part of an entirely new refresher sample. In 
total, 17,364 individuals were successfully tracked from 1998 to 2006. 
These households were selected from a CAPMAS (Central Agency for 
Public Mobilizations and Statistics) master sample prepared in 1995. 
The questionnaire is composed of three major sections: (1) a household 
questionnaire administered to the head of household or the head’s 
spouse that contains information on basic demographic characteristics of 
household members, movement of household members in and out of the 
household since 1998, ownership of durable goods and assets, and housing 
conditions, (2) an individual questionnaire administered to the individual 
him or herself containing information on parental background, detailed 
education histories, activity status, job search and unemployment, detailed 
employment characteristics, a module on women’s work, migration 
histories, job histories, time-use, earnings and fertility. (3) a household 
enterprise and income module that elicits information on all agricultural 
and non-agricultural enterprises operated by the household as well as all 
income sources, including remittances and transfers (Barsoum, 2007).
The ELMPS is the first panel data available in the Arab region and is 
known for its richness, which allows economists to closely study various 
issues related to the Egyptian labor market. In the present study, all 
women aged between 16 and 64 are considered. The analysis of domestic 
production activities is based on a specific question: how did you spend 
the preceding week. In the data, domestic activities were classified into 14 
groups (see Appendix A for more details). However, for the 1998 survey, only 
three aggregated questions are available. For this reason, in the following 
section, I conduct the cross sectional analysis using only the 2006 survey 
since this is able to reflect the real time that women spend in domestic 
activities. In addition, a panel analysis is conducted using all women who 
were single in 1998 and changed (or not) their marital status between 
1998 and 2006. In the panel analysis, the sample consists of 1,850 women.
3. Stylized Facts
3.1 Cross-sectional Analysis
 Table 1 shows the time-use of women and men by marital status in 2006. 
All numbers showed in this table are weekly mean hours. Egyptian married 
women spend weekly, on average, 46.72 hours on domestic chores. Turning 
our attention to market labor supply, men spend longer hours on market 
9activities than women, and this does not seem to differ among married 
and unmarried men. Contrary to men, single women spend longer hours in 
the market than married women do, at 43.86 and 37.34 hours, respectively. 
Also, single and married women spend 19.09 and 46.72 hours respectively 
on ‘work at home’ activities. Note that the ‘work at home’ category is 
composed of housework activities as well as child care activities. Total 
work is calculated as the sum of hours spent on both market and domestic 
activities. Interestingly, the latter is higher for women than for men 
whether they are married or single. As shown in Table 1, for the married 
population, 84.04 and 50.92 hours among women and men, respectively, 
are spent on total work. Again, men are assumed to not participate at all 
in domestic activities, which is not a strong assumption for the Egyptian 
context. Finally, leisure is calculated as the difference between the total 
time available per week and the time spent on total work. 
 
Table 1: Time-use by gender and marital status in 2006  
Women Men 
Time-use
(Mean hours) 
 Married  Not married  Married  Not married 
Work at home  46.72  19.09  -  - 
Housework  37.15  18.58  -  - 
Child care  9.57  0.51  -  - 
Work in the 
market 
 37.34  43.86  50.92  50.01 
Total work   84.04  62.95  50,92  50,01 
Leisure  27.96  49.05  61,08  61,99 
Notes: i. - means that this information is not available in the ELMPS 2006. 
ii. Total work represents the sum of all time spent on work in the market and work at home. 
iii. Leisure is calculated as the difference between total time available per week (24-8 “time for sleeping’’ 
multiplied by 7) and the time spent on total work.
Source: Author’s calculations using the ELMPS of 2006. 
Table 2 displays the time allocation of both single and married taking 
into account the presence or not of children in the household. It shows 
that married women having children spend the greatest amount of hours 
on domestic work, at 51.72 hours per week. They spend about 20 hours 
more on domestic activities compared to women without children and 30 
hours more compared to single women. Marriage increases dramatically 
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the time spent on housework activities; the number of hours is 19.97 
and 31.74 respectively for singles and married women without children. 
Married women with children remain the most productive, with a weekly 
time spent on total work of 60.98 hours. 
Table 2: Time-use of all women: Sample means by marital status and the presence of 
children in the household*  
Time-use *  Single  Married  Married  All 
  without children  with children  
Market work  8.87  7.56  9.26  8.83 
Domestic work  20.84  32.58  51.72  37.53 
Housework  19.97  31.74  38.86  30.97 
Child care  0.87  0.84  12.86  6.56 
Total work 29.71  40.14  60.98   46.36 
 N  4103  2000  5526  11629 
Note: * This table shows women’s time-use using weekly hours of work.
Source: Author’s calculations using the ELMPS of 2006. 
Table 3 displays women’s time allocation by marital status and age 
group. Interestingly, regardless of the age group, single and married women 
spend a similar number of hours on market activities. However, married 
women in general tend to spend longer hours on domestic activities than 
their single counterparts do. For instance, for the 16-35 age group, married 
and single women spend on average 32.05 and 18.91 hours respectively 
on domestic activities. Consequently, for all age groups, the ‘total work’ 
category is significantly greater for married than for single women. Turning 
our attention to the 46-64 age group, married and single women spend 
40.91 and 31.75 hours respectively on total work. Similarly, married and 
single women aged between 16 and 35 spend 37.54 and 26.80 respectively. 
However, there is no difference in total work for the 36-45 age group. To 
put it in a nutshell, married women do not work less in the market but do 
work much more at home than single women do. 
Table 3: Time-use of all women: sample means by marital status and age group
Time-use  Single  Married  
  16-35   36-45   46-64   16-35   36-45   46-64 
continued u
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Market work  7.89  19.26  8.81  5.49  18.31  8.05 
Domestic work  18.91  34.49  22.94  32.05  32.28  32.86 
Housework  18.28  31.35  21.99  31.92  32.03  31.64 
Child care  0.63  3.14  0.95  0.12  0.25  1.22 
Total work   26.80   53.75   31.75   37.54   50.59   40.91
 N  2954  284  865  640  65  1295 
Source: Author’s calculations using the ELMPS of 2006. 
Table 4 presents married women’s time allocation by the presence of 
children in the household and by age group. For the 36-45 age group, we 
observe that the presence of children decreases time spent on market 
work by five hours. This is the result of child care activities that increase 
significantly with the presence of children. Thus, children largely influence 
women’s total work; 60.85 hours for those with children and 50.59 hours 
for women without children. In Table 4, women with and without 
children aged between 16 and 35 spend 62.30 and 37.54 hours on total work 
respectively. This is also valid for the other age groups. To conclude, both 
marriage and fertility are important factors affecting both market and 
domestic labor supply. 
Table 4: Time-use of married women: Sample means by presence of children and age 
group  
Married without children   Age 16-35  Age 36-45  Age 46-64 
 Market work  5.49  18.31  8.05 
 Domestic work  32.05  32.28  32.86 
 Housework  31.92  32.03  31.64 
 Child care  0.12  0.25  1.22 
  Total work   37.54   50.59   40.91 
  N  640  65  1295 
Married with children         
 Market work  6.46  13.83  13.11 
 Domestic work  55.84  47.02  39.42 
 Housework  38.98  39.24  36.80 
continued u
12
 Child care  16.86  7.77  2.62 
  Total work   62.30   60.85   52.53 
  N  3379  1645  502 
Source: Author’s calculations using the ELMPS of 2006. 
Table 5 presents the time allocation of married women by number of 
children. It mainly distinguishes between three types of married women: 
those who don’t have children, those who have only one child and those 
who have two children or more. It is worth noting that the first child is 
the one who affects the mothers’ time-use patterns the most. As shown in 
Table 5, the arrival of the first child increases the time spent on domestic 
activities by more than 20 hours (from 32.74 to 53.91) and decreases by only 
one hour, on average, the time spent in the labor market. This is mainly due 
to a significant increase in the time spent on child care activities. Similarly, 
the time spent on total work for married women without children and 
married women with one child is 40.35 and 60.34 respectively. 
Table 5: Time-use of married women: Sample means by the number of children
  Number of children  
Time-use  Zero  One  Two or more  Total
Market work  7.61  6.43  10.08  8.83 
Domestic work  32.74  53.91  51.15  46.72 
Housework  31.9  36.23  39.65  37.04 
Child care  0.84  17.68  11.49  9.68 
Total work   40.35  60.34   61.23   55.5 
N  1989  1229  4293  7511 
Source: Author’s calculations using the ELMPS of 2006. 
Table 6 shows working women’s time allocation by economic sector. 
It reveals that, in general, women working in the private sector work 
for longer hours than both women who work in the public sector and 
independent workers. Turning our attention to single females, these 
women spend 41.11, 54.27 and 36.99 hours in the public, private and the 
independent sectors respectively. Furthermore, 70.34 percent of all women 
working in the private sector are single. Compared to married women, 
single women spend longer hours in the private sector. However, public 
sector labor supply is similar for all women. In addition, the presence 
of children in the household decreases, as expected, both public and 
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private employment. Table 6 also shows that 59.68 percent of all women 
working in the public sector are married and have children. This is thanks 
to the flexibility of working hours and the family-friendly policies in the 
public sector. Concerning the independent sector, single, married women 
without children and married women with children spend 36.99, 31.43 and 
32.89 hours respectively. Although the independent sector is dominated by 
married women, as will be shown later, having a family project increases 
female market labor supply. Generally, the owners of the family project 
are members of the same household. Finally, only 31.83, 15.68 and 52.49 
percent of single women, women married without children and women 
married with children, respectively, are working in the labor market. 
Table 6: Time-use of all women: Sample means by marital status, presence of children 
and working sector (working women only)  
   Single  Married  Married  All 
 without children  with children 
Public   41.11 (23.3%) 41.41 (17.03%)  40.55 (59.68%)  37.72 (100%)
Government  40.93  41.16  40.42  
Public 
enterprises  42.84  44.92  43.25  
Private   54.27 (70.34%)   47.12 (6.3%)   43.2 (23.36%)  51.70 (100%)
Formal  51.09  45.15  44.7  
Informal  55.93  49.45  45.84  
Independent   36.99 (27.23%)  
  31.43 
(17.58%) 
  32.89 
(55.18%)   33.75 (100%)  
N   830 (31.83%)   409 (15.68%)   1369 (52.49%)    2608 (100%)
 Source: Author’s calculations using the ELMPS of 2006. 
Table 7 displays married women’s time allocation by level of education. 
Interestingly, we observe that the higher the level of education the 
greater is women’s total work. More precisely, women who are illiterate, 
less than intermediatly educated, intermediately educated and have an 
above intermediate education spend, respectively, 49.65, 51.37, 60.85 
and 65.67 hours on total work. Note that the time spent on child care 
activities increases with the level of education. Moreover, women with 
an intermediate education or above have higher market labor supply than 
those with a less than intermediate education. Consequently, as shown in 
Table 7, increasing married women’s level of education implies an increase 
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in the time spent on both total work and child care activities, and decreases 
the time spent on housework activities.
Table 7: Time-use of married momen: Sample means by level of education
    Level of education   
  Illiterate  Less than 
intermediate 
 Intermediate  Above 
intermediate 
 Total 
Age  40.17  34.78  31.36  33.99  36 
Time-use      
Market 
work 
 6.68  3.14  9.79  17.66  8.83 
Domestic 
work 
 42.97  48.23  51.06  48.01  46.72 
Housework  36.42  38.51  37.87  36.08  37.04 
Child care  6.55  9.72  13.18  11.94  9.68 
Total work   49.65   51.37   60.85   65.67   55.5 
 N  3241  955  2146  1167  7511 
Source: Author’s calculations using the ELMPS of 2006.  
Table 8 shows, for single women, the same information available in 
Table 7. Single women with high levels of education spend between five 
and ten hours less on domestic activities than illiterate single women. 
Women with an above intermediate education also have higher market 
labor supply than less educated ones. Interestingly, illiterate single women 
spend longer hours in total work than women with a less than intermediate 
or an intermediate education. This result was expected since working, for 
illiterate women, is an absolute necessity. Nevertheless, those having an 
above than intermediate education are those who work the most since 
they spend 41.01 hours on all activities compared to 34.79, 20.04 and 29.07 
among those who are illiterate, have less than intermediate education and 
have an intermediate education, respectively 
Table 8: Time-use of single women: Sample means by level of education
    Level of education
  Illiterate  Less than 
intermediate 
Intermediate  Above  Total 
Age  42.73  22.45  23.05  28.02  29.41 
continued u
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Time-use      
Market work  8.73  3.77  9.02  19.66  8.97 
Domestic work  26.06  16.27  20.05  21.35  21.05
Housework  24.76  15.70  19.20  20.73  20.17 
Child care  1.29  0.56  0.85  0.62  0.88 
Total work   34.79   20.04   29.07   41.01   30.02 
 N  1211  1026  1296  522  4056 
Source: Author’s calculations using the ELMPS of 2006. 
More detailed results on women’s time allocation by marital status are 
presented in Figures 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, and 6. Clearly, as shown in Figure 1, the 
hours spent on domestic activities are significantly higher for married 
women than for single ones. However, married and single women spend 
similar amounts of time on market employment.
Figure 1: Time allocation by marital status
Source: Constructed by the author using the ELMPS 2006. 
Figure 2 displays the results for all illiterate women. They spend longer 
hours on both domestic and market activities. As mentioned above, this 
result is in line with expectations.
16
Figure 2: Time allocation by marital status: Illiterate wom
Source: Constructed by the author using the ELMPS 2006.
 
Figures 3 and 4 present the difference between women with general 
and technical intermediate education. Interestingly, married women’s time 
allocation changes dramatically across the two figures. Among women 
with a general education, married women’s market labor supply is higher 
than single women’s. In contrast, Figure 4 shows that for the population 
with a technical education, single women are those who spend longer 
hours in the labor market. 
Figure 3: Time allocation by marital status: Women with eneral intermediate education 
 Source: Constructed by the author using the ELMPS 2006. 
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Figure 4: Time allocation by marital status: Women with technical intermediate education
Source: Constructed by the author using the ELMPS 2006. 
Finally, for women with an above intermediate or university education, 
Figures 5 and 6 show similar results. Generally, single women work more in 
the labor market and less in domestic activities than married ones.  
Figure 5: Time allocation by marital status: Women with above intermediate education
Source: Constructed by the author using the ELMPS 2006.
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Figure 6: Time allocation by marital status: University educated women
Source: Constructed by the author using the ELMPS 2006. 
3.2  Panel Analysis
This section aims to understand how women’s time allocation changes 
over time as they transition into marriage. To address this issue, I rely on 
the panel component of the ELMPS of 1998 and 2006. The sample I use 
consists of all women that were single in 1998 and did or did not change their 
marital status before 2006. The working sample is then restricted to single 
women aged 13 to 35 years in 1998, noting that the legal age of marriage in 
Egypt is 16. The final sample contains 1,144 women. In the panel analysis, 
I compare the time allocation of women who remained single during the 
entire eight-year period to those who got married between 1998 and 2006.
Figures 7 and 8 display the evolution of women’s time allocation, by 
age group, from 1998 to 2006 respectively for women who did and did 
not change their marital status within this eight-year period. Figure 7 
presents the time allocation of women who got married between 1998 and 
2006. In other words, all women represented in Figure 7 were single in 
1998 and married in 2006. Time allocation seems to change dramatically 
with marriage. Clearly, the time spent on domestic activities became 
significantly higher after marriage. For the 26-39 age group, domestic 
labor supply grew from 21 hours to 52 hours weekly in 1998 and 2006, 
respectively. Turning our attention to market labor supply, women work 
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less when they are married than when single. This observation is in line 
with our expectations, since marriage creates the double burden issue that 
prevents women from spending long hours in the labor market. 
Figure 7: Time allocation evolution of newly married women by age group
Note: Women presented in this figure are those who changed their marital status to become married between 
1998 and 2006. 
Source: Constructed by the author using the ELMPS of 1998 and 2006.  
Similarly, in Figure 8, we observe women that remained single between 
1998 and 2006. For all age groups, both domestic and market labor supply 
are similar in 1998 and 2006. Thus, keeping the same marital status avoids 
big changes in employment patterns. All single women spend between 15 
and 30 hours per week on domestic activities. The number of hours tend 
to increase with age, as the 40-45 year old women spend the longer hours 
compared to the younger groups. Also, market labor supply is higher for 
women aged 30 years old and above in 2006 than in 1998. Notably, the 
reason for this is that, with age, single women become more and more 
discouraged about finding a partner in the marriage market.  
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Figure 8: Time allocation evolution of women who remained single by age group
Note: Women presented in this figure are those who did not change their marital status between 1998 and 2006. 
Source: Constructed by the author using the ELMPS of 1998 and 2006.  
Table 9 displays women’s transitions into and out of market activity by 
marital status. Interestingly, for single and married women, respectively, 
75.64 and only 40.4 percent of those who were working in 1998 continue 
to participate in market activities in 2006. Furthermore, 59.60 percent 
of women who got married between 1998 and 2006 dropped out of the 
labor force by 2006, relative to only 24.36 percent among their single 
counterparts. Thus, Table 9 shows important transitions from market 
activity to inactivity as a result of marriage. Again, marriage seems to 
significantly increase the probability of exiting the labor market. 
 
Table 9: Employment transitions between 1998 and 2006 by marital status
    Market work in 2006 
  Single   Married 
Market work 
in 1998  No  Yes  Total  No  Yes  Total 
 No  285  106  391  500  76  576 
   72,89  27,11  100  86,81  13,19  100 
Yes  19  59  78  59  40  99 
   24,36  75,64  100  59,6  40,4  100 
continued u
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Total  304  165  469  559  116  675 
   64,82  35,18  100  82,81  17,19  100 
Note: All females were single in 1998.
Source: Author’s calculations using the panel sample 1998-2006. 
Turning our attention to the evolution of domestic labor supply 
between 1998 and 2006, we see that, not surprisingly, 100 percent of 
married women were engaged in domestic activities in 2006. 
Table 10: Transitions from/into domestic activities by marital status in 2006   
    Domestic work in 2006
  Single   Married 
Domestic 
work 
in 1998 
 No  Yes  Total  No  Yes  Total 
 No  21 
(13,64%)
 133 
(86,36%)
 154 
(100%)
 0 (0%)  142 
(100%)
 142 
(100%)
Yes  27 
(8,57%)
 288 
(91,43%) 
 315 
(100%) 
 0 (0%)  533 
(100%)
 533 
(100%)
Total  48 
(10,23%)
 421 
(89,77%) 
 469 
(100%)
 0 (0%)  675 
(100%) 
 675 
(100%)
Note: All females were single in 1998.
Source: Author’s calculations using the panel sample 1998-2006. 
Both the cross-sectional and panel analyses presented above illustrated 
that women who transitioned into marriage were less likely to pursue 
market work and, were also more likely to be involved in domestic activities 
than their unmarried peers.
4. Propensity Score Matching Model 
The main objective of this section is to measure the Average Treatment 
Effect on the Treated (ATT) where the treatment is getting married 
between 1998 and 2006. For this, a propensity score matching model is 
estimated to identify how selection into marriage alters the time allocation 
of women.
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4.1 The Propensity Score Basic Setting
Rosenbaum and Rubin (1983) proposed propensity score matching 
as a method to reduce bias in the estimation of treatment effects with 
observational data sets. This method has become increasingly popular, 
particularly in the evaluation of economic policy interventions.
The propensity score method is a popular inexact matching method. 
Rather than matching on the regressors, it matches on the propensity 
score. Propensity score matching does not require a unique match, which is 
a major advantage compared to exact matching, since households with no 
exact match do not have to be excluded. In this way, we prevent regression 
to the mean by matching based on a distance measure (the distance is then 
the difference in propensity).
When treatment is not by random assignment but depends stochastically on a 
vector of observable variables iX , as in observational data, or when the treatment 
is targeted to some population defined by some observable characteristics (such as 
age, sex, or socioeconomic status), then the concept of propensity scores is useful. This 
is a conditional probability measure of treatment participation given iX  and is 
denoted )( iXp  (Cameron and Trivedi; 2005).
By definition, the assignment of subjects to the treatment and control 
groups in observational studies is not random. Therefore, there is no 
direct counterpart of the ATT. Hence, the estimation of the effect of the 
treatment may be biased by the existence of confounding factors. In other 
words, the counterfactual is not identified. As a substitute, following 
Rosenbaum and Rubin (1983), we may obtain data from a set of potential 
comparison units that are not necessarily drawn from the same population 
as the treated units, but for whom the observable characteristics, iX , 
match those of the treated units up to some selected degree of closeness. 
More precisely, the propensity score allows us to correct the estimation of 
the treatment effect, controlling for the existence of these confounding 
factors, based on the idea that bias is reduced when the comparison of 
outcomes is performed using treated and control subjects that are as 
similar as possible to one another.
The propensity score is defined by Rosenbaum and Rubin (1983) as 
the conditional probability of receiving a treatment given pre-treatment 
characteristics:
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where {0,1}=D  indicates whether the agent is treated or not, and X  is a 
vector of pre-treatment characteristics. Now, let us consider a population 
of individuals denoted by i . If the propensity score )( iXp  is known, then 
the Average Treatment Effect on the Treated (ATT) can be estimated as 
follows,
 
                                                                                                                        (2)   
  
 
where iY1  and iY1  are the potential outcomes in the two counterfactual 
situations of treatment and no treatment.
Some hypothesis need to be made in order to derive Equation 2 given 
Equation 1. First is the balancing of pre-treatment variables given the 
propensity score, 
 )(| XpXD ⊥                                                                     (3)
 
We aso need to assume that assignment to the treatment is unconfounded, 
 XDYY |, 01 ⊥                                                                     (4)
 
Thus,the assignment to the treatment is unconfounded given the 
propensity score, 
 )(|, 01 XpDYY ⊥                                                                (5)
 
It is important to note that the second hypothesis about unconfoundness 
cannot be tested. However, the first hypothesis about balancing can be 
verified. If Equation 3 is satisfied, then, for a given propensity score, 
exposure to the treatment is random and therefore treated and control 
groups should be on average observationally identical. Hence, any standard 
probability model can be adopted to estimate the propensity score.
1}=|{= 01 iii DYYE −τ
)}}(1,=|{{= 01 iiii XpDYYEE −
1}=|)(0,=|{)}(1,=|{{= 01 iiiiiii DXpDYEXpDYEE −
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4.2 Identification of the Model
As Becker and Ichino (2002) argued, the propensity score is estimated 
according to the following process:  
1.  Estimate a probit model of the likelihood of marriage, 
 )((=}|1={ iii XhXDPr Φ                                             (6)
 
where Φ  is the normal (logistic) c.d.f. and )( iXh  represents the vector of 
covariates that determine the treatment (the decision to marry between 
1998 and 2006).
More precisely, I run the following logistic regression, 
 ittiitit ZXy εδβ ++ −1)(=                                                     (7)
 
where ity  is a dummy variable that equals one if the woman married 
between 1998 and 2006 and zero otherwise. itX  is a vector of explanatory 
variables at date t (2006) that determine the probability of marriage, 
such as age, level of education, and region of residence. 1)( −tiZ  is vector 
of lagged variables at date t-1 (1998), such as the woman’s work status 
and the wealth of her parental household. The latter is used because all 
women in my sample were single in 1998 and were then living in their 
parental household. itε  represents the error term that follows a normal 
distribution )(0,σ:N . 
2.  I split the sample into k  equally spaced intervals of the propensity 
score ( 5=k ). 
3.   Within each interval, I test for the similarity between the average 
propensity scores of the treated and the control groups. The test is 
repeated until, under all alternatives, the average propensity score of 
treated and control units do not differ. 
4.  Within each interval, the means of each characteristic should 
not differ between treated and control units. This is a necessary 
condition for the balancing hypothesis. 
4.3 The Average Treatment Effect on the Treated 
The estimation of the propensity score is not enough to estimate the 
ATT using Equation 2. The reason is that the probability of observing two 
units with exactly the same propensity score is almost zero since )(Xp  
is a continuous variable. To solve this problem, different methods have 
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been proposed in the literature such as nearest neighbor matching, radius 
matching, and kernel matching.These methods reach different points on 
the frontier of the tradeoff between quality and quantity of the matches. 
However, none of them is a priori better than the others.
In the present research, I opt for the nearest neighbor method to 
match treated and control groups. The nearest neighbor method is an 
easy method that allows the comparison of the matched variables of 
the simulated control group with those of the intervention group. This 
method consists of looking for the closest propensity score in the control 
group to the propensity score of each woman in the treated group, and 
matching these cases to one another. Note that a woman in the control 
group can be the best match for more than one woman in the treated 
group.After matching, the difference between the outcome of the treated 
women and those of the matched control women is computed. Then, the 
ATT can be obtained by averaging these differences, although, some of 
these matches can be poor since the nearest neighbor may have a very 
different propensity score.
Let us denote the treated group (e.g. the women who got married 
between 1998 and 2006) by T  and the control group (e.g. the women who 
remained single during the entire period) by C . TiY  and 
C
jY  represent the 
observed outcomes of the treated and control groups respectively. The 
nearest neighbor matching can then be represented as, 
 PP ji
j
ppiC −min=)(                                                        (8)
 
where )(iC  is the set of the control women matched to the treated women 
i  with an estimated value of the propensity score of ip .
Equation 8 could be a single match or a set of multiple nearest neighbors. 
Note that the latter is rarely used, in particular, if the characteristics X  
contains continuous variables; the likelihood of multiple nearest neighbors is 
further reduced if the propensity score is estimated (Becker and Ichino; 2002).
The number of controls matched with observation Ti ∈  is denoted 
by CiN  and the weights are defined by C
i
ij N
w
1
=  if )(iCj ∈  and 0=ijw  
otherwise. The formula can then be written as follows, 
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where M stands for the nearest neighbor matching and TN  represents 
the number of women in the treated group. The weights jw  are defined 
by 
ijij
ww ∑= .
We now turn our attention to the variances of these estimates. To derive 
these variances, the weights are assumed to be fixed and the outcomes are 
assumed to be independent across women. 
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“Note that, to save on computing time, nearest neighbors are not determined by 
comparing treated observations to every single control, but by first sorting all 
records by the estimated propensity score and then searching for the closest control 
unit(s)” (see Becker ad Ichino; 2002).
5. Empirical Results
This section presents the empirical results of the propensity score 
matching model. For the sake of robustness checking, I have tested 
different matching methods, including the single nearest neighbor, the 
five nearest neighbor and kernel matching. Sensitivity analysis shows that 
the results are quite robust. Since the results are very similar for all these 
methods, only those of the single nearest neighbor are analyzed in the 
present section. The results of the other matching methods are presented 
in detail in Appendix B.
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A total sample of 1,144 women is used to estimate the model. As 
described above, these women have been selected based on particular 
criteria. Now, turning our attention to the two subgroups, 41 percent of 
the sample are treated versus 51 percent control.
To obtain the results presented here, I first started by estimating a 
model of selection into marriage (a probit model) that allows the estimation 
of a propensity score for each woman in the sample. Using this propensity 
score, each treated woman searches forward and backward for her match 
in the control group (using either a single or a five nearest neighbor or 
other matching method). Before calling the matching process, the data was 
randomly sorted and, interestingly, observations with identical propensity 
score values have been observed. In addition, with regards to the matching 
results, 674 of 675 treated units have been matched. 
The following tables display the results obtained, specifically, those 
of the Average Treatment Effect on the Treated (ATT) as well as the 
Average Treatment Effect (ATE) and the Average Treatment Effect on the 
Untreated (ATU). Two outcomes are considered. On the one hand, I aim 
to identify the effect of marriage on market labor supply. On the other 
hand, the treatment effect on domestic labor supply is identified.
Table 11: Variable means and standard deviations by marital status  
      Single   Married   All
Variables   N Mean  Sd. 
dev.
 N Mean  Sd. 
dev.
 N  Mean  Sd. 
dev.
In 1998          
Age 469 20.49 4.78 675 19.99 3.43 1144 20.19 4.04
Age at marriage  -  -  - 675 23.49 3.64 675 23.49 3.64
Market labor supply 54 11.72 7.95 110 10.74 6.58 164 11.06 7.05
Domestic labor supply 469 18.79 17.65 675 23.48 16.97 1144 21.56 17.4
Nbr. of children in 
household
 -  -  -  -  -  -  -  -  -
Dummy for market 
work
469 0.17 0.37 675 0.15 0.35 1144 0.15 0.36
Low household wealth 469 0.84 0.36 675 0.86 0.34 1144 0.85 0.35
High household wealth 469 0.16 0.36 675 0.14 0.34 1144 0.15 0.35
Household size 469 6.36 2.69 675 6.56 2.82 1144 6.48 2.77
In 2006          
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Age 469 27.55 4.9 675 27.09 3.52 1144 27.28 4.15
Market labor supply 166 45.6 12.5 121 41.04 10.78 287 43.68 12
Domestic labor supply 469 21.65 17.8 675 52.22 31.6 1144  39,69 30.74
Father’s education 160 3.06 2.31 664 2.9 2.23 824 2.93 2.25
Mother’s education 59 1.53 1.29 655 1.98 1.8 714 1.94 1.77
Nbr. of children in 
household
 -  -  - 675 1.35 0.86 675 1.35 0.86
Dummy for market 
work
469 0.35 0.48 675 0.17 0.38 1144 0.25 0.43
Illiterate 469 0.08 0.27 675 0.09 0.29 1144 0.09 0.28
Less than intermediate 
educ.
469 0.12 0.32 675 0.13 0.34 1144 0.13 0.33
General intermediate 
education
469 0.01 0.09 675 0.01 0.12 1144 0.01 0.11
Technical intermediate 
educ.
469 0.3 0.46 675 0.39 0.49 1144 0.35 0.48
Above intermediate 
education
469 0.07 0.25 675 0.06 0.24 1144 0.06 0.25
University education 469 0.36 0.48 675 0.29 0.45 1144 0.32 0.47
Household size 469 5.3 2.18 675 3.55 1.37 1144 4.27 1.95
Cairo 469 0.21 0.41 675 0.15 0.36 1144 0.17 0.38
Alexandria 469 0.16 0.36 675 0.15 0.36 1144 0.15 0.36
Urban lower regions 469 0.19 0.39 675 0.15 0.35 1144 0.16 0.37
Urban upper regions 469 0.2 0.4 675 0.19 0.39 1144 0.19 0.39
Rural lower regions 469 0.13 0.33 675 0.22 0.42 1144 0.18 0.39
Rural lower regions 469 0.12 0.32 675 0.15 0.35 1144 0.13 0.34
Basic services in 
household
469 3.12 1.25 675 3 1 1144 2.86 1.17
Source: Author’s calculations using the ELMS of 1998 and 2006.  
Table 12 presents the results of the selection into the treatment model, 
i.e, the selection into marriage model (which corresponds to women who 
got married between 1998 and 2006). Clearly, the probability of being 
treated increases with the level of education. In other words, females with 
a less than intermediate level of education, as well as those having a general 
intermediate level of education, had higher probabilities of getting married 
between 1998 and 2006 relative to their illiterate peers. The model also 
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controls for age, working status in 1998 and parental household wealth in 
1998. The probability of marriage increases with age and decreases with 
the parental wealth. 
Table 12: Treatment selection: Model 1
     Coefficient  Std. Err.  T. Stat. 
Age  0.641 ***  0.101  6.31 
Age squared  -0.010 ***  0.002  -6.45 
Less than intermediate 
education  0.256 **  0.155  1.65 
General intermediate education  0.651 **  0.375  1.73 
Technical intermediate education  0.336 ***  0.130  2.58 
Above intermediate education  0.131  0.189  0.69 
University education  0.102  0.141  0.72 
Market work in 1998  -0.025  0.117  -0.21 
Household Wealth in 1998: High  -0.132 ***  0.048  -2.73 
Constant  -9.139 ***  1.492  -6.12 
Log Likelihood  -736.588   
Pseudo R2  0.049   
Prob > chi2  0.000   
Nbr. of Observations  1140.000   
Note: i. Dependent variable is a binary variable that is equal to one if the woman married between 1998  and 
2006 and, equal to zero if the female remained single at least until 2006.
ii. *** statistically significant at the 1% level, ** statistically significant at the 5% level, 
* statistically significant at the 10% level.
 iii. The reference level of education is illiterate.
Source: Author’s calculations.  
In Table 13, we observe the distribution of the propensity score (PS). 
The mean of the PS is of 0.591 with a variance of 0.013. 
Table 13: Propensity score distribution: Model 1
    Percentiles Pr (Treated)   
1%  0.156  0.072   
5%  0.381  0.073  Mean  0.591 
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10%  0.445  0.078  Std. Deviation  0.117 
25%  0.539  0.078   
50%   0.604   Variance  0.013 
75%  0.672  0.807  Skewness  -1.266 
90%  0.723  0.812  Kurtosis  5.839 
95%  0.749  0.82   
99%  0.779  0.821  N  1140 
 Source: Author’s calculations.
Turning to the results of the matching, Table 14 shows the matching 
estimates for the two outcomes, these being the domestic and market 
labor supplies.1 Results of the Average Treatment Effect (ATE) show the 
difference-in-difference in outcomes. In other words, the ATE shows 
the difference between the treated and the untreated women. Compared 
to untreated units, treated women spent on average about 30.079 hours 
more on domestic work and 7.551 hours less on market work. The Average 
Treatment Effect on the Treated (ATT) equals  31.442 and -8.667 for the 
domestic and market labor supplies respectively. 
Table 14: Matching estimates: Model 1
Hours spent on 
domestic work 
 Treated  Controls  Difference  S.E.  T. Stat. 
ATT  52.231  20.789  31.442  1.797  17.5 
ATU  21.672  49.781  28.109   
ATE    30.079   
Hours spent on 
market work 
Treated  Controls   Difference  S.E.  T. Stat. 
ATT  7.368  16.037  -8.667  1.824  -4.75 
ATU  16.208  10.275  -5.933   
ATE    -7.551   
Notes:   i. These are the results of the single nearest neighbor matching.
ii. ATT is the Average Treatment Effect on the Treated, ATU is the Average Treatment Effect on the Untreated and 
ATE is the Average Treatment Effect.
 iii. Number of treated: 674. Number of controls: 466.
Source: Author’s calculations.  
1 These are number of weekly hours.
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These results seem to confirm our hypothesis that marriage explains 
an important part of the low female market labor force participation in 
Egypt. Again, Egyptian married females need a more equitable allocation 
of domestic activities within their own households, as well as more 
efficient family-friendly policies in the labor market.
A second specification of the selection equation is presented in Table 15. 
Compared to Table 12, we observe that the value of the Pseudo R-squared 
is significantly higher using the second specification; 0.183 and 0.049 
respectively for the Models 2 and 1. In Table 15, I also control for the region 
of residence as well as for the parent’s level of education. Living in Cairo 
significantly decreases the probability of getting married between 1998 
and 2006 by 25.3 percent. In addition, parental education, in particular the 
mother’s education, clearly affects the probability of marriage. 
Table  15: Treatment selection: Model 2
     Coefficient  Std. Err.  T. Stat. 
Age  0.534 ***  0.107  4.99 
Age squared  -0.009 ***  0.002  -5.10 
Less than intermediate education  0.269 **  0.158  1.70 
General intermediate education  0.551 *  0.392  1.40 
Technical intermediate education  0.324 **  0.134  2.41 
Above intermediate education  0.048  0.201  0.24 
University education  -0.155  0.149  -1.04 
Living in Cairo  -0.253 **  0.119  -2.13
Mother’s education 2  1.544 ***  0.306  5.05
Mother’s education 3  1.942 ***  0.348  5.57 
Mother’s education 4  2.093 ***  0.519  4.03 
Father’s education 2  0.799 ***  0.152  5.25 
Father’s education 3  0.774 ***  0.159  4.88 
Father’s education 4  0.325 *  0.236  1.38 
Market work in 1998  -0.012  0.124  -0.10 
High HH wealth in 1998  -0.306 ***  0.056  -5.46 
Constant  -7.823 ***  1.576  -4.96 
Log likelihood  -630.138   
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Pseudo R2  0.183   
Prob > chi2  0.000   
Nbr. of Observations  1140.000   
Notes:  i. Cairo is a dummy variable equal to 1 if the woman is living in Cairo and zero otherwise.
ii. The reference group for the parental level of education is illiterate.
iii. Mother/father’s education 2 is less than intermediate education. Mother/father’s education 3 is   
intermediate education. Mother/father’s education 4 is above than intermediate. The reference  
here is illiterate.
iv. *** statistically significant at the 1% level, ** statistically significant at the 5% level, 
* statistically significant at the 10% level.
 Source: Author’s calculations. 
Again, Tables 16 and 17 show, respectively, the distribution of the PS 
and the matching results for the second specification (Model 2). For the 
domestic labor supply as an output, the ATT is 25.797 with a T statistic of 
8.45. The ATE equals 28.583. Then, controlling for more variables in the 
second specification not only allows for an improvement in the model’s 
quality, but also modifies the matching results. Turning our analysis to the 
market work output, the ATT is -7.541 and the ATE is identified as (-7.841). 
Table 16: Propensity score distribution: Model 2
   Percentiles  Pr (Treated)   
1%  0.099  0.025   
5%  0.211  0.031  Mean  0.591 
10%  0.276  0.052  Std. Deviation  0.227 
25%  0.439  0.056   
50%   0.590   Variance  0.052 
75%  0.744  0.998  Skewness  -0.021 
90%  0.942  0.998  Kurtosis  2.342 
95%  0.979  0.999   
99%  0.995  0.999  N  1140 
Source: Author’s calculations. 
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Table 17: Matching estimates: Model 2
Hours spent on domestic 
work  Treated  Controls Difference  S.E.  T. Stat. 
 ATT  52.231  26.435  25.797  3.054  8.45 
 ATU  21.672  54.285  32.614   
 ATE    28.583   
Hours spent on market 
work 
  Treated Controls Difference S.E.     T. Stat. 
 ATT  7.468  14.909  -7.541  3.642  -2.07 
 ATU  16.208  7.933  -8.275   
 ATE    -7.841   
Note: These are the results of the single nearest neighbor matching.
Source: Author’s calculations. 
A third specification of the selection into marriage model was tested. 
This model only differs in the regions’ distinction. Instead of controlling 
for only one dummy for region that equals 1 if the woman lives in Cairo and 
zero otherwise, I distinguish between five different regions. The results of 
Model 3 are presented in Tables 18, 19 and 20. Interestingly, the Average 
Treatment Effect (ATE) for market labor supply is -12.978 weekly hours, 
and, it equals 27.47 for the domestic labor supply. 
Table 18: Treatment selection: Model 3
     Coefficient  Std. Err.  T. Stat. 
Age  0.536 ***  0.108  4.96 
Age square  -0.009 ***  0.002  -5.05 
Less than intermediate education  0.286 **  0.161  1.78 
General intermediate education  0.511  0.395  1.29 
Technical intermediate education  0.354 ***  0.136  2.60 
Above intermediate education  0.109  0.203  0.54 
University education  -0.109  0.151  -0.72 
Urban lower Region  -0.050  0.126  -0.40 
Urban upper Region  0.001  0.122  0.01 
Rural lower Region  0.457 ***  0.130  3.51 
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Rural upper Region  0.237 *  0.147  1.61 
Mother’s education 2  1.469 ***  0.301  4.88 
Mother’s education 3  1.945 ***  0.349  5.56 
Mother’s education 4  2.057 ***  0.511  4.03 
Father’s education 2  0.848 ***  0.154  5.52 
Father’s education 3  0.778 ***  0.160  4.86 
Father’s education 4  0.311  0.237  1.31 
Market work in 1998  -0.048  0.125  -0.39 
High HH Wealth in 1998  -0.272 ***  0.059  -4.61 
Constant  -8.061 ***  1.599  -5.04 
Log likelihood  -623.453   
Pseudo R2  0.191   
Prob > chi2  0.000   
N  1140.000   
 Notes:  i. The reference category for region is Cairo and Alexandria.
ii. *** statistically significant at the 1% level, ** statistically significant at the 5% level, 
* statistically significant at the 10% level.
Source: Author’s calculations. 
Table 19: Propensity score distribution: Model 3
     Percentiles Pr (Treated)   
 1%  0.112  0.034   
5%  0.208  0.043  Mean  0.591 
10%  0.266  0.044  Std. Deviation  0.234 
25%  0.416  0.063   
 50%   0.591   Variance  0.054 
75%  0.758  0.997  Skewness  -0.031 
90%  0.946  0.998  Kurtosis  2.175 
95%  0.980  0.998   
99%  0.993  0.998  N  1140 
Source: Author’s calculations. 
35
Table 20: Matching estimates: Model 3
Hours spent on 
domestic work 
 Treated  Controls  Difference  S.E.  T. Stat. 
ATT  52.231  24.09  28.141  3.047  9.23 
ATU  21.672  48.182  26.511   
ATE    27.47   
Hours spent on 
market work 
Treated  Controls  Difference  S.E. T-stat. 
ATT  7.368  22.133  -14.765  3.612  -4.09 
ATU  16.208  5.815  -10.392   
ATE     -12.978   
Note: These are the results of the single nearest neighbor matching.
Source: Author’s calculations. 
6. Conclusions
We have plenty of information and studies on the time that women 
spend in the labor market, but none on the submerged part of their time 
spent at home. Economists have made a huge effort to explain the market 
behavior of married women, such as, their patterns of participation, the 
number of hours worked, the determinants of wives earnings, occupational 
choice, and the gender wage differential. Although the present research 
is the first to analyze the allocation of time within the home sector, 
this allocation may have an impact on the well-being of the family that 
is no less important than changes in women’s working haIt seems quite 
difficult to detect the effect of policy measures on actual individual 
behavior, especially with regards to work, child care and housekeeping. It 
is necessary, however, to calculate how much time is spent on each of the 
above activities. No money is involved in work like cooking, taking care of 
the children or house cleaning, though much time is needed for this kind 
of work. If women have to pay for the value of domestic work in order to 
reconcile family and working life, the risk that they will leave their labor 
market position as well as their independent incomes becomes higher.
Thus, Egypt, as most developing and developed countries, needs 
many regulation reforms to reduce the persistent gender bias in intra-
household division of labor. For this, policies that support women’s access 
to productive employment, with equal wages for equal jobs, taking full 
account of the burden of women’s family and household responsibilities, 
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strongly need to be considered. An example of such kinds of jobs could be 
part-time jobs and also the supply of day care for children.
We expect the results of this study to be of great importance to 
policymakers and non-governmental organizations, especially when 
designing family policies. More specifically, effective public policies 
are needed to actively support the role of the family, i.e. of women, to 
substitute for the lacking welfare state to affect the division of paid and 
unpaid work. Policies affecting not only women’s participation in the labor 
force but also people’s attitudes towards the division of paid and unpaid 
work are needed. It turns out that the existing policies in Egypt are not 
sufficient in this respect.
This study aims at identifying how selection into marriage alters the 
time allocation of women. The objective is then to explore this new area 
of research in Egypt in order to gain insight into policy measures that 
can effectively influence women’s time allocation. A matching model is 
estimated to identify how selection into marriage alters the time allocation 
of women. The empirical results show that marriage significantly affects 
both types of work. Married women spend weekly about eight hours less 
on market work relative to their single counterparts. And, interestingly, 
marriage as a treatment increases the domestic labor supply by thirty 
hours weekly on average.
More effective policies in Egypt would thus allow not only for the 
increase of women’s participation in paid work, but also a more equitable 
division of labor within families. Best practice arrangements could be: 
employee sovereignty over working times, equal access to productive 
employment with equal wages for equal jobs (for men and women), 
promotion and benefits, and the reconciliation of paid work and family 
life. It is surely important to find appropriate forms of intervention 
for supporting the family, which should include financial support for 
beneficiaries, without undermining the structure of family life. Organized 
voluntarism could also play an important role, while informal networks, 
which have traditionally sustained the family, should be reinforced.
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Annex A: More About the Data 
Time-use Data: Domestic Activities
• Housework: washing dishes, doing laundry, cleaning house; 
• Food and drink: raising poultry, producing butter/ cheese, cooking; 
• Home maintenance: helping in construction work; 
• Care activities: caring for the sick/ the elderly, taking care of 
children; 
• Shopping for the household; 
• Agriculture activities, collecting water, collecting firewood.
Definitions
The Market Definition of Labor Force “includes all females engaged 
in economic activities for purposes of market exchange.’’ (Assaad and El-
Hamidi, 2009).
The Extended Definition of Labor Force “ includes those engaged 
in the production and processing of primary products, whether for the 
market, for barter, or for their own consumption; the production of all 
other goods and services for the market; and, in the case of households 
that produce such goods and services for the market, the corresponding 
production for their own consumption. The extended definition includes 
many women engaged in animal husbandry and the processing of dairy 
of products for purposes of household consumption, in addition to those 
engaged in market activity.’’ (Assaad and El-Hamidi, 2009).
Domestic Activities is defined as the unpaid work done to maintain 
family members and/or a home. In the present study, we distinguish between 
two categories of domestic work. The first category is “housework’’ and 
the second is “child care.’’ In our data, “housework’’ includes agriculture 
activities, raising poultry, producing butter/ cheese, cooking, washing dishes, 
doing laundry, cleaning house, collecting water, collecting firewood, helping 
in construction work, caring for the sick/ the elderly and shopping for the 
household. “Child care’’, represents the time spent taking care of children.
The Extra-Extended Definition of Labor Force includes those 
considered as working according to the market definition, the extended 
definition, or engaged in domestic activities.
Independent Workers All women with irregular wage jobs, household 
enterprise workers, and the self employed with no household members.
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Annex B: Sensitivity Analysis 
Results of the Five Nearest Neighbor Matching
 Table 21: Matching estimates using the five nearest neighbor method: Model 1
Hours spent on 
domestic work 
 Treated  Controls  Difference  S.E.  T. Stat. 
ATT  52.231  21.082  31.149  1.577  19.75 
ATU  21.672  49.404  27.733   
ATE    29.753   
Hours spent on 
market work 
Treated  Controls Difference S.E.  T. Stat. 
ATT  7.368  17.025  -9.657  1.441  -6.70 
ATU  16.208  9.851  -6.357   
ATE    -8.308   
Notes: i. These are the results of the five nearest neighbor matching.
ii. The number of treated cases is 674 and the number of controls is 466.
Source: Author’s calculations.  
Table 22: Matching estimates using the five nearest neighbor method: Model 2
Hours spent on 
domestic work 
 Treated  Controls  Difference  S.E.  T. Stat. 
ATT  52.231  24.242  27.989  2.241  12.49 
ATU  21..672  54.18  32.508   
ATE    29.836   
Hours spent on market 
work 
  Treated  Controls  Difference  S.E.     T. Stat. 
ATT  7.368  17.983  -10.615  2.536  -4.19 
ATU  16.208  7.719  -8.489   
ATE    -9.746   
Notes: These are the results of the five nearest neighbor matching.
Source: Author’s calculations. 
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Table 23: Matching estimates using the five nearest neighbor method: Model 3
Hours spent on 
domestic work 
Treated  Controls  Difference  S.E.  T. Stat. 
ATT  52.231  25.079  27.152  2.330  11.65 
ATU  21.672  52.443  30.771   
ATE    28.632   
Hours spent on 
market work 
Treated  Controls  Difference      S.E.    T. Stat. 
ATT  7.368  16.019  -8.651  2.589  -3.34 
ATU  16.208  6.054  -10.154   
ATE    -9.265   
Note: These are the results of the five nearest neighbor matching.
Source: Author’s calculations. 
Kernel Matching Results
  
Table 24: Matching estimates using the kernel matching method: Model 1
Hours spent 
on domestic 
work 
 Treated  Controls  Difference  S.E.  T. Stat. 
ATT  52.231  22.125  30.107  1.525  19.74 
ATU  21.619  50.347  28.727   
ATE    29.545   
Hours spent 
on market 
work 
 Treated  Controls  Difference  S.E.  T. Stat. 
ATT  7.368  16.348  -8.979  1.347  -6.67 
ATU  16.222  9.796  -6.427   
ATE    -7.94   
Note: These are kernel matching results.
Source: Author’s calculations. 
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Table 25: Matching estimates using the kernel matching method: Model 2
Hours spent 
on domestic 
work 
 Treated  Controls  Difference  S.E.  T. Stat. 
ATT  52.231  24.861  27.369  2.33  11.74 
ATU  21.672  53.625  31.953   
ATE    29.243   
Hours spent 
on market 
work 
 Treated  Controls  Difference       S.E.     T. Stat. 
ATT  7.368  16.75  -9.382  2.648  -3.54 
ATU  16.208  7.347  -8.861   
ATE    -9.169   
Note: These are kernel matching results.
Source: Author’s calculations. 
 
Table 26: Matching estimates using the kernel matching method: Model 3
Hours spent 
on domestic 
work 
 Treated  Controls  Difference  S.E.  T-stat. 
ATT  52.231  24.948  27.283  2.393  11.40 
ATU  21.672  51.826  30.154   
ATE    28.457   
Hours spent 
on market 
work 
Treated  Controls  Difference  S.E.  T-stat. 
ATT  7.368  16.952  -9.585  2.739  -3.50 
ATU  16.208  6.882  -9.326   
ATE    -9.479   
Note: These are kernel matching results.
Source: Author’s calculations.  
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Annex C: More On Labor Supply Determinants
Table 27: Determinants of domestic labor supply
 Single (16-64)   Married (16-64)   All 
Coefficient  Coefficient  Coefficient 
Age in 2006 2,617***  1,412***  4,049*** 
Age squared in 2006 -0,034***  -0,023***  -0,047*** 
Age at marriage -  0,212**  - 
Household (HH) wealth in 1998 -1,360***  0,891**  -1,009*** 
Basic Services in 2006 -0,641  -0,753*  -1,622*** 
Less than intermediate education 14,185***  1,349  7,925*** 
General intermediate education 3,723  -0,802  10,953*** 
Technical intermediate education 8,473***  1,865  12,243*** 
Above intermediate education 9,460***  2,141  12,764*** 
University education 6,654***  -1,913  9,463*** 
Nbr. of children in HH 1,454*  4,890***  6,138*** 
Parent in the HH -  -30,323***  -24,164*** 
Sister/Bro. in law in HH -  -  -26,280*** 
Mother in law in HH -  -15,750  -39,366*** 
Dummy for family project 1,021  -1,559  -0,891 
Urban regions 0,667  -7,404***  -4,042*** 
Rural regions -0,551  -4,176***  -1,887*** 
Constant -22,570***  22,121***  -41,202*** 
Sigma 19,494  27,028  25,718 
Log likelihood -6868,7003  -18045,825  -33284,573 
Pseudo R squared 0,0188  0,0109  0,0626 
  N 1835  3851  8554 
Notes: i. Tobit Results. 
ii. Dependent variable: weekly hours spent on domestic work. 
iii. The  reference level of education is illiterate. The reference region is Cairo/ Alexandria.
Source: Author’s calculations. 
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Table 28: Determinants of market labor supply
    Singles (16-64)  Married (16-64)   All 
 Coefficient  Coefficient  Coefficient 
Age in 2006  -0,350  0,429  0,103 
Age squared in 2006  0,003  -0,006*  -0,002 
Age at marriage  -  0,097  - 
Household (HH) wealth in 1998  -0,212  -1,159***  0,368*** 
Basic Services in 2006  -0,510  -0,120  -0,026 
Less than intermediate education  -1,542  -0,387  -0,016 
General intermediate education  20,031  -3,974  3,616 
Technical intermediate education  1,412  -1,896  -2,061 
Above intermediate education  -1,482  -2,592  -3,407***
University education  -8,518**  -1,659  -4,390***
Nbr. of children in HH  2,459  -0,517  -1,053*** 
Parent in the HH  -  -14,810  -0,362 
Sister/Bro. in law in HH  -  -  -6,277 
Mother in law in HH  -  -  -20,724 
Dummy for family project  0,637  1,305*  1,855*** 
Urban regions  -3,816**  -2,988***  -3,678***
Rural regions  -8,665***  -4,823***  -6,308***
Constant  67,175***  61,426***  62,445***
Sigma  13,104  11,787  12,939 
Log likelihood  -1244,3003 -3681,4066  -5886,6716
Pseudo R squared  0,0418  0,0253  0,0267 
N  313  948  1480 
Note: Tobit results. 
Source: Author’s calculations. bits.
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